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SEc. 1. Importance of the rule8 of .Evidence- View of .Ellenborough, Man8field, and &tor'y-Erkine'sHigh .Bulogium.
It is difficult to over-estimate or over-state the importance of the
rules of evidence. In the celebrated case of Higham vs. Ridgway,
1 East 109, where the contemporaneous written entry of an
accoucheur was admitted after his death to prove the date of the

birth of the child, Lord
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ELLENBOROUGH,

C. J., began his opinion
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with the following observation:-" I should be extremely sorry if
anything fell from the court upon this occasion, which would ifh
any degree 'break in upon those sound rules of evidence which
have been established for the security of life, liberty, and
property."
An eminent American jurist of equal ability and yet more
various learning and of large experience as a judge was, in a very
analogous case, similarly impressed. In Nichols vs. Webb, 8
Wheat. 326, 332, where, following the early decision of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Welsh vs. Barre4t, 380 (A. D.
1819) and Doe vs. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 898, the Supreme Court
of the United tStates sanctioned the reception as evidence of the
books of a deceased notary, Mr. Justice STORY remarks :-" The
rules of evidence are of great importance, and cannot be departed
from without endangering private as well as public rights.
Courts are therefore extremely cautious in the introduction of
sny new doctrines of evidence which trench upon old and established principles."
We have conducted the examination of the question we propose briefly to discuss fully impressed with the justness of these
views, and are gratified in the belief that the conclusion which we
have reached neither involves the introduction into the law- of evidence of any new principle or the subverting of any old one.
While it is dangerous to innovate, yet it must be admitted to be sometimes necessary to do so.
The law as a science is much indebted for its present symmetry
to wise and cautious reformers-of whom Lord MANSFIELD is the
type and model. The law of evidence has been very greatly
liberalized and improved within the last century,-perhaps -o
branch of the law more so. Said the ceiebrated judge last named,
speaking of this subject :-" We do not sit here and take the rules
of evidence from Keble or from Siderfin." The present tendency of courts is to admit that light may come from many sources
which were closed by the rigid and technical rules of the ancient
common law. The whole doctrine of the admissibility of entries
and declarations of deceased persons is of comparatively modern
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origin, and indeed it is almost within our own day that the Law of
Evidence has justly deserved the eloquent and exalted eulogium
of Lord ERSKINE :-" The principles of the Law of Evidence are

founded in the charities of religion-in the philosophy of
nature-in the truths of history-and in the experience of common life :" 24 Howell's St. Trials 966.
SEc. 2.-Subject stated, viz., Verbal declarations of deceased
persons against interest as evidence.
We do not propose to discuss the subject of the admissibility of
written entries made by deceased persons.
These divide themselves into two general and well-known classes.
One of these classes, of which Price vs. Torrington, Salk. 285, is
the type, is where the entry is a contemporaneous one made by a
person since deceased and in the ordinary course of busineas,
whether official or private. The other class, of which Hfigham vs.
Ridgway, 8upra, is usually cited as the type, is where the entry
of the deceased person derives its admissibility from the fact that
it was made against the pecuniary interest of the party at the
time. Entries or statements reduced to writing, these requisites
concurring, are generally if not univershlly both in England and
in this country receivable in evidence after the death of the party
making them, in actions between third persons. If it were within
the purview of our subject we could very clearly show that the
gifted and lamented HORACE BINNEY WALLACE is mistaken in
point of fact when he says (note to Higham vs. Ridgway, 2 Smith
L. Cas. 291), - that there is no adjudged case in the United States
which establishes it as a principle that admissions or entries by a
third person against his interest are admissible evidence after
his death."
The object of this article will be to show that the English .and
American auth-orities sanction the reception as evidence, in actions
between third persons, of verbal admissions when the following
requisites concur :-lst. The declarant must be dead at the trial,
and not simply beyond the jurisdiction of the state or country:2d. The declaration or admission must be plainly against his
pecuniary interest at the time it is made :-3d. It must be the
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expression of a fact of which the declarant must be presumed
to have had actual and personal knowledge, and with reference to
which, 4th, no known or probable motive to falsify can be perceived.
SEo. 3.-Opinion of ahief Justice Shaw, and of Cowen & HillCorrectnes8 of di8tinction between oral and written statements
called in question.
W6 have been led to examine the question whether verbal
declarations stand upon the same footing in principle (though of
course inferior in weight and value), in consequence of an observation of the late Chief Justice SHAW, and of the American editors
of Phillipps on Evidence.
In treating of the general subject of the admissibility of
,declarations by deceased persons against their interest," these
learned editors remark :-,,We believe not one (case) has yet
gone the length of saying that the oral declaration of a person,
however much it may militate against his interest, shall be
received merely upon the ground that he is dead :" 3 Phil. Ev.,
Cow. & Hill's Notes, 260. It was held in Lawrence vs. .Kimball,
1 Met. 524, which was an action by the plaintiff against the
assessors for ordering his property sold for taxes which he c aimed
were in fact paid, that a deceased collector's statements in a conversation with a third person that the tax in question had been
paid were not admissible in evidence, not being part of the
res ge8to and not being in writing. ",It is argued," says Ch. J.
SHAW, in delivering the opinion of the court in this case, "cthat
the evidence was within another exception to the rule respecting
hearsay, viz., being an admission against his interest at the time:

Higham vs. Ridgway, 10 East 109. But we think this has been
confined'wholly to cases of entries made in books, &c., by a person deceased in relation to a matter contrary to his interest at
the time." The ,looseness and uncertainty of mere verbal
statements" compared with the ,clearness and certainty of
written memoranda" is made the ground of the alleged distinction.
See also Pramington vs. Barnard, 2 Pick. 582, for a similar
view.
We may remark in passing that this infirmity attaches to all
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verbal admissions, but the law does not for that reason wholly
reject them, We- are not now considering whether the law ought
to confine the declarations of deceased persons hostile to their
interests to written statements, but whether, as a matter of fact, it
has- so wholly confined" them.
With great deference we are constrained to the conclusion that
the authorities and cases do not establish any distinction in
principle, though they concede of course the difference in value,
betweern oral and written admissions. We will take a brief view
first of the English and then of the American authorities.
SEC. 4.-English text-books8-Phillipps, Starkie, and Best-and
cases referred to and cited.
Mr. PHIL.LIPPS treating of this subject (Ev. Vol. I., p. 310)
says:-In the cases, which have been referred to it will have
been noticed that the declarations have in most instances consisted of memoranda or entries, but from several of the, examples
it may be collected that verbal'declaration8are admissible though
unaccompanied by any writing or by any act done.'" In the
note he reniarks :- Verbal declarations may be thought of
inferior value to those written, as being more carelessly made
and being often unfaithfully reported ; they are besides less
frequently connected with any course of business.'
Mr. STARKIE regards " the rules by which the reception of this
class of evidence is governed as not being very strictly defined :"
1 Ev. 44: yet considers it as an established principle of evidence that if a party who has peculiar knowledge of the fact by
his written entry, or even his declaration concerning it, charges
himself or discharges another upon whom he would otherwise
have a claim, such entry is admissible evidence of the fact after
the death of the party: Id. 855: -and oral declarations
depend partly upon the same principles with written entries,
but are far 'Weaker in degree :" Id. 3651 note p, 7 Am. Ed.
The most recent English author on Evidence is Mr. BEST. HP
lays down the rule that declarations against interest made by
deceased parties are receivable in evidence in proceedings between
third persons, at least when made against their pecuniary interest.
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Best on Ev. 577, see. 483-5, 2 Lond. Ed. 1855. He thus continues :-" 'In both classes of cases, viz., declarations against
interest and declarations in the ordinary discharge of duty, the
evidence commonly appears in a written form, and it has even
been meade a question whether this is not essential to its
admissibility: Furston vs. Clogg, 10 M. & W. 572. The
inclination of the authorities, however, is rather to the effect that
verbal declarations, answering of course the requisite conditionb are
equally receivable, and it seems difficult' to establish a distinction
.in principle between the cases:" Id. sec. 485.
The general doctrine and the exception under consideration
was thus stated by PARKE, J., in Middleton vs. Helton, 10 B. &
Cr. 317, which was,' however, a case of a written entry, but the
ground of the reception of the evidence applies equally to oral
declarations :-"-The general rule undoubtedly is that facts must
be proved' by testimony on oath. This case falls within the
exception necessarily engrafted upon that rule, viz. : that an
admission of a fact by a deceased person which is against the
interest of the party making it at the time, is evidence of that
fact between third persons."
It would transcend the prescribed limits of this article to refer
with minuteness to the English cases where verbal admissions
have been received. We will allude briefly to one or two, and
must then content ourselves with a simple citation of others.
In 1767 Lord CAMDEN, Oh., admitted verbal declarations of a
deceased devisee to prove that certain property devised to her
was in trust for her daughter, though no trust was expressed in the
will: Strode vs. Winchester, 1 Dick. 397. In Ivat vs. Finch, 1
Taunt. (1808) 141, the verbal admissions of a deceased former
owner of personal property (Mrs. Watson), though accompanied
by no act, that she had sold it to the plaintiff were held admissible
to his favor against a third person, because made against her
interest. Ch. J. MANSFIELD after remarking that the weight
depends upon circumstances, said :The admission of Mrs.
Watson was against her own interest. Had this been an action
between Mrs. Watson and the present plaintiff, her acknowledg-
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ment that the property belonged to him might clearly have been
given in evidence."
See also Doe vs. Williams, 1 Cowp. (1777} 621, per Lord
MANSFIELD ; Doe vs. Pettett, 5 B. & Aid. (1821) 228 ; Davies vs.
Pierce, 2 D. & E. 53; Davis vs. Lloyd, 1 0. & K. 275 (47 Eng.
Com. L. 278); Doe vs. Jones, I Camp. 867; Barker vs. Bay,
(A. D. 1826) 2 Russ. 68, per Lord ELDON, whose only doubt was
whether the declarations are not to be received even if not against
interest. Peaceable vs. Watson, 4 Taunt. 16. And see opinions
of Lords BROUGHIAm and CAMPBELL in the celebrated Sussex
Peerage Case, 11 C. & Fin. 85, 111, 118, seemingly ignoring
any distinction between verbaldeclarationsand written statements;
also brief of Mr. Heald, 2 Russ. 6a.
SEC. 5.-American Authorities-Prof. G-reenleafs opinionCases cited-Illustrations of doctrine in White vs. Choteau,
Coleman vs. Frazier, and Rinckley vs. Davis.
Mr. Greenleaf thus states the doctrine and the ground upon
which it rests :-" But declarations of the other class are
secondary evidence and are received only in consequence of the
death of the person making them. .This class embraces not
only entries in books, but all other declarations or statements of
facts, verbal or in writing, and whether they were made at the
time of the fact declared or at a subsequent day. But to
render them admissible it must appear that the declarant is
deceased; that he possessed competent knowledge of the facts
or that it was his duty to know them; and that the declarations were at variance with his interest. When these circumstances concur the evidence is received, leaving its weight and
value to be determined by other circumstances: I Greenlf. Ev.
sec. 147. The ground upon which this evidence is received is
the extreme improbability of its falsehood :" Id. sec. 148; and
(it might be added) the necessity of the case.
It is noticeable that Mr. Greenleaf supports his text wholly by
reference to English decisions. And the truth is, the question as
to verbal admissions has not arisen in our courts as frequently as
might have been supposed, and in general it does not appear to
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have been very accurately examined or thoroughly considered.
Without going into the American cases at large, with the excep.
tion of two or three of the most pointed and best considered of them,
we may state that the reception of verbal admissions of deceased
declarants against their interest is more or less strongly supported
by the following cases: Coleman vs. Frazier(1850), 4 Rich. (S. C.
Law) 147; Hinckley vs. Davis, 6 N. H. 210; White vs. Choteau,
10 Barb. 202 (A. D. 1850); s. P. & s. c., 1 E. D. Smith 493;
People vs. Blakely (A. D. 1859), 4 Park. Cr. Rep. 176; Gilchrist
vs. Martin (1831), 1 Bailey's Eq. 492; Balliday vs. Littlepap, 2
Munf. 316; Prather vs. Johnson, 3 H. & Johns. 487; Trego vs.
Buzzard, 19 Pa. St. 441; s. c. 35 Id. 9. See also 25 Id. 834;
Respub. vs. Davis, 3 Yeates 128; Simonton vs. Boucher, 2 Wash.
473; Mahaska County/ vs. Ingles, 15 Iowa.
White vs. Ohoteau, ubi suzp., well illustrates the doctrine.
Briefly the case was this :-The plaintiff, a broker, sued in his
own name for goods sold, the owner being dead. It
became material for the plaintiff to prove his interest in the matter to entitle
him to maintain the action, and for this purpose he offered to
prove-ist, the deceased owner's verbal declarations that he had
received the broker's guaranty; 2d, his declaration that the
broker had made a sale, and that he had received the money as
the broker's guaranty. It was decided that the former declaration, not being opposed to the owner's interest, was inadmissible.
but that the latter was at variance with his interest, and therefore competent, citing Ivat vs. Finch, 1 Taunt. 141 ; 4 Id. 16; 1
, Such declarations," says EDWARbS, J.,
Greenl. Ev. § 147.
",need not be in writing:" S. c., 1 E. D. Smith 493, where the
same ruling was followed, and where- it is held that the other
requisites concurring, the admission is receivable whether made at
the time the facts occurred or afterwards.
Coleman vs. Frazier,above cited, and which was decided the
same year (1850), may be profitably referred to. The defendant,
a postmaster, was sued for negligence for permitting money to be
stolen from the office by one Meigs. Meigs admitted that he
stole the money, and the court sanctioned the reception of this
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testimony to charge the defendant on the ground that -it was the
admission of an act committed by the party against his interest,
and subjecting him to infamy and heavy penal consequences, and
who was dead at the trial." Says the court: "cThe admission of
such testimony arises from necessity, and the certainty that it is
true from the want of motive to falsify." The infamy and penal
consequences alone, we may add, would not constitute grounds for
its reception, but are simply circumstances adding to its weight:
.Davisvs. Lloyd, 1 0. & K. 275. Infra, sec. 7.
Hinckley vs. Davis, 6 N. H. 210, was decided by a court of
high respectability, and is strikingly apposite. The action was
against a surety on a note. The defence of the surety was that
Blood, the principal, had paid the note by keeping sheep for the
plaintiff. It became material to ascertain the price of the keeping. The plaintiff introduced a witness who swore that Blood,
while he was keeping the sheep, said he was to have only $1 per
year for each sheep. It appearing that Blood was dead, the
evidence was adjudged rightly received. Per RICHARDSON, C. J.:
"The admissions of Blood were made at a'time when no motive
to misrepresent the matter can be conceived. They were admissions against his interest. He is now dead and cannot be called
as a witness, and his admissions related to a matter with which he
must have been well acquainted. The evidence results in such a
case from the improbability of a man's admitting as true what he
knows to be false against his interest," and the court cites some
of the English cases before referred to. It is observable that the
doclarations of Blood were no part of the res ge8tce, for the res
gestm would be the actual contract between Blood and the plaintiff.
SEC. 6.-Analogies of the law favor the reception of this evidence.
The analogies of the law favor the admissibility of oral declarations, for there are cases where the admissions of strang rs to the
suit are receivable. Thus the verbal admissions of a party, whom
the sheriff permitted to escape when confined on civil process, are
evidence in an action against the sheriff, to show the extent of

liability of the party escaping: Bogers vs. Jones, 7 B. & 0. 86;
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Pugh vs. McRae, 2 Ala. 393; Strong vs. Wheeler, 5 Pick. 410;
and see I Greenl. Ev., § 181, for similar cases.
Suc. 7.-Recapiulation-B8sential prerequisites of this specia
of evidence.
To sum up: This species of evidence being somewhat anomalous
in its character and standing on the ultima thule of competent
testimony, is not highly favored by the courts, and the tendency
is rather to restrict than enlarge the right to receive it, or at least
to require the evidence to be brought clearly within all the conditions requisite for its reception. From, the' unbroken current of
English, and the decided preponderance of American authority,
we think the present state of the law is, that verbal declarations
are receivable when accompanied by the following prerequisites :
1st. The declarant must be dead. To this we believe the
English cases make no exception.
* Mere absence from the jurisdiction Afill not answer: Brewster
vs. Deane, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 537, and cases; Moore vs. Andrews, 5
Port. (Ala.) 107. Although by the course of decisions in some
of the states, with reference to written entries, absence might
possibly be treated as equivalent to death. See I Greenl. Ev.
§ 163, and note; Alton vs. Berghaus, 8 Watts 77 ; 1 Smith's L.
Cas. 340 (top). As to insanity, see Union Bank vs. Knapp, 3
Pick. 96. Unless it might be in the case of confirmed .insanity,
we are of opinion that the decease of the declarant should be held
an indispensable condition to the admissibility of oral declarations.
2d. The next prerequisite is, that the declaration must have
been against the interest of the declarant at the time, and that
interest must be a pecuniary one. It is not sufficient that the
declaration would subject the party to penal consequences: Davis
vs. Lloyd, 1 C. & K. 275 (47 Eng. C. L. Rep. 273); Sussex
Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 111, 113.
But these consequences would add to the weight of the testimony. The conflict of the declaration with the pecuniary interest
of the declarant must be clear and undoubted, as this is the main
ground of the reception of this species of evidence.
3d. The declaration must be of a fact or facts, in relation to a

